‘If I can be punished for something, should I expect to be included in discussions about the thing I could be punished for, along with the kind of punishment that will be meted out? For example, if I live in a society where ‘being aggressive’ is considered a criminal act, should there ever be a reason to exclude me from discussions about what it means to be aggressive and how aggression should be punished?’
Thank you, Alastair Gray, for an important question!
The question about who should be included in discussions about laws can be raised about any issue like taxation, voting systems, welfare policies, and, as you note, punishment for criminal wrongdoing. Perhaps the question is especially important when it comes to punishment, given that punishment has a significant impact on the lives of those affected. In this Opinion, I will address the broader question, but feel free to raise issues about punishment in the comments!
Let me illustrate the question with an example. Ben is a citizen of country X. Country Y plans to build nuclear power plants close to its border with X, not far from Ben’s home. But Ben does not have the right to vote in Y.
(Voting is perhaps not the only way of being ‘included in discussions’, but it is certainly one way, perhaps the main way, by which we can influence political decisions in democratic societies, and discussions therefore often focus on the right to vote.)
Some philosophers think that everyone whose interests will be affected by a political decision should have a right to be included in the decision-making process. On this view, Ben should have a say with regard to country Y’s nuclear power plant building plans.
However, in today’s globalized world, many decisions taken by governments affect people worldwide. This raises practical problems. We lack the institutions for giving all those affected by a decision a say in the decision making process. It is also difficult to say what a fair consideration of affected interests would look like, because people can be affected by decisions to different degrees.
A different view is that inclusion in the decision-making process should be restricted to a certain group of people; for example, citizens of a country. The challenge for this view is to draw the boundaries of inclusion in a way that is not arbitrary. For example, citizenship is usually granted at birth. But it seems that where one is born is a matter of pure luck that should not matter morally.
It is important not to interpret this second view as saying that the interests of those excluded from the decision-making process do not matter. For example, both views might agree that the government of country Y has a moral duty not to put Ben at risk of harm. The difference between the views is that the first view, but not the second, would say that Ben has a right to be included in country Y’s decision-making process in some way.
What we see here is a disagreement about whether people should be included in political decision-making that affects them, or is it enough that their rights be taken into account by those making the decision.
What do you think? Would you like to be included in decisions that affect you? Let us know in the comments.
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I am a PhD student at the University of Southampton, having previously done an MRes Philosophy at the University of Reading and a BA in Philosophy and Political Science at Otto-Friedrich-University in Bamberg. I specialize in moral and political philosophy. Thinking about the future fascinates me, and I enjoy teasing apart concepts like rights, risk, harm, and benefit, and thinking about what they can tell us about challenges like climate change.