Is it wrong to be selfish if you don’t let it show?

Thank you for this intriguing question, Sagar Samant!

Let me start by clarifying the question. There are different ways in which you can do a bad thing and ‘don’t let it show’. In some cases, it is obvious that someone has done wrong, but nobody suspects you. For example, you rob a bank and never get caught. In other cases, the victim does not know that she has been wronged. For example, you steal a watch and the person assumes the watch got lost somewhere. I think that in both cases, what you have done is wrong. Generally, a good person does not rob banks or steal watches.

I take it that your question concerns a third kind of case, where someone acts like a good person but with their own advantage in mind. Here is an example: Thea saves a child from drowning not because she cares about the child, but because she really likes reading her name in the newspaper.

Something about Thea seems morally dubious. But saving a child from drowning is a heroic thing to do. So, what is the problem with Thea’s behaviour?

Philosopher Immanuel Kant drew a famous distinction between acting from duty and acting according to duty. Thea acts according to duty: she saves the child. However, Thea does not act from duty: she is not motivated by good will. She does not want to do the morally right thing; rather, she is only interested in her personal advantage. Kant thought that only acting from duty has real moral value. And so, since Thea’s action lacks good will, the moral value of her action is diminished.

A problem with this interpretation of Kant’s view is that it is very demanding. Most of us have different reasons for the things we do, and often we do things out of self-interest (at least in part). Does that mean our actions never have full moral worth? Moreover, Thea has saved a life. Some philosophers think that this consequence of her action is what matters. If these philosophers are right, then even though Thea’s reasons for acting might reflect badly on her character, they do not change the moral value of her action.

What do you think? Do our reasons for acting matter? Let us know in the comments.

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I am a PhD student at the University of Southampton, having previously done an MRes Philosophy at the University of Reading and a BA in Philosophy and Political Science at Otto-Friedrich-University in Bamberg. I specialize in moral and political philosophy. Thinking about the future fascinates me, and I enjoy teasing apart concepts like rights, risk, harm, and benefit, and thinking about what they can tell us about challenges like climate change.

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