Thank you, Amir Ayazbayev, for a great question!
This question concerns two important philosophical problems: What does it mean to be human? And, what should be the limits of medical intervention? In the case of genetic engineering, we can distinguish three main perspectives. The first, called bioconservatism, suggests that there is an undefined ‘X factor’ somewhere in our biological structure that is responsible for making us human. Since we cannot be sure exactly what it is, and since being human is worthy of protection, we should not mess with our genetic code in any way. The second perspective, called bioliberalism, argues that humankind has always tried to improve itself. Education, hygiene and culture can all be seen as artificial interventions on a human being. There is no biological human essence; rather, the human is a work-in-progress. So, on this view, there is no difference between making high school students read Hamlet, taking regular showers, and having no genetic diseases. The third perspective focuses on the practical aspects of introducing genetic engineering, because even if there is no such thing as a biological human essence, genetic intervention may still be unethical. There is a crucial difference between education and genetic engineering: you can always decide that Shakespeare sucks and you prefer watching Friends reruns (I can empathize with this). But you cannot influence your genetic structure; and with genetic engineering, it is decided not by chance (or some transcendent being), but by parents or even by government (as in the case of government regulations that some genetic diseases have to be treated).
We can reasonably assume, however, that the possible child would agree to the treatment of potential diseases; so, genetic engineering in the medical context would not be that bad from the third perspective. To some extent it already happens: during in vitro fertilization there are preimplantation genetics diagnostics which make sure that the implanted embryo does not have any harmful genetic conditions. Even so, there are some problems with the question of what counts as a disease. Is balding a disease? Is stupidity a disease? For some unfortunate people, even life itself can be seen as an undesirable state; not to mention that some homophobes or racists would probably argue that sexual orientation or race are also kinds of disease. With more advanced genetic engineering we may be able to influence all these features. There are many wrongful life court cases: some people with severe disabilities sue their parents for giving them a life not worth living. If genetic engineering were more common, could I sue my parents for my being bald? On the other hand, sometimes disability is desired. There was a famous case in the UK where deaf parents during the in vitro fertilization process wanted to implant an embryo which would grow into a deaf child. But it was illegal to implant embryos which would have disabilities in the future, and deafness is perceived as such. On the other hand, for some deaf people, the inability to hear is not a disability, but simply a difference, one which allows them to participate in a specific culture (the Deaf culture). It could be argued that those parents have the right to nurture their children in their own cultural community.
To conclude, human genetic engineering as a medical practice seems controversial only for the most radical bioconservatives, but people certainly have different ideas about what medical intervention should or should not do. Even so, I believe that there are some medical conditions (which are practically a death sentence or make a person fully dependent on their caregivers) on the treatment of which most would agree.
What do you think? Would genetically engineering humans be all that bad? Let us know in the comments.
And, as always, if you have a question for the Armchair Philosophers, don’t hesitate to get in touch. You could send us a message or fill in this form.
Image: (credit)
I have studied philosophy since 2010 at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (I do not like moving). Currently, I am trying really hard to finish my Ph.D. thesis concerning the concept of the technical object in contemporary continental philosophy. I mostly work in the field of philosophy of technology, poststructuralism, critical theory, and posthumanism. Personally, I am a big fan of relational ontologies. I believe that the "essence" of things is only a consequence of their relations to other entities. I haven't published much in English, but check my Academia profile or contact me if you are interested in my research.