Thank you, Charmaine Elaine, for this multi-faceted question.
The phrase “taking a stand” can be used to describe a variety of behaviors in different contexts; in what follows, I will consider two interpretations. First, is it wrong not to engage in political activity? Second, is it wrong not to adopt a firm position on a controversial moral issue?
By “political activity,” I mean voting, campaigning, protesting, and so on. In countries where voting is legally mandated, our answer to the question will involve our moral duty to obey the law, which is an enormous issue in itself. So, I will restrict my discussion to political activity that is not legally required.
The classic argument against engaging in political activity, and voting in particular, is that it will have no discernible effect on political outcomes. From a consequentialist point of view, it is wrong to make whatever sacrifices are involved in engaging in the activity if it will not make a difference. One response is to simply argue that political activity can make a difference. For example, if candidate A’s term in office would give each of 350 million people in the U.S. a slightly greater benefit than candidate B’s – because, say, one of A’s policies would make virtually everyone slightly wealthier – and the odds of one’s vote deciding the election is one out of 350 million, then the expected value of voting for candidate A is slightly greater than the expected value of voting for B. So, from a consequentialist point of view, it is imperative to vote for A rather than B, provided that the costs to oneself are not high.
Another response is to deny that consequences are all that matter. It might be argued that if no one engaged in political activity, then we would not have a healthy democracy, which is a public good. So, if you do not engage in political activity, you are not doing your fair share to contribute to a public good. Given that we seem to have a duty to promote the good, and engaging in at least some kinds of political activity is not unreasonably costly, it could be argued that we ought to do so.
The second interpretation of the question is whether it is wrong not to adopt a firm position on a controversial moral issue. At first glance, one might wonder, if it is not wrong not to adopt a firm position on a non-moral issue, why would it be wrong not to do so with respect to a moral issue. For example, we may not have enough evidence to decide one way or another, or we may have some evidence, but not enough to warrant a high level of confidence.
However, it might be argued that not adopting a firm position on a moral issue is tantamount to supporting the moral status quo. For example, if a white person in mid-1950s America decided not to adopt a firm position on the issue of segregation, this was tantamount to allowing segregation to continue. This is undeniably a risk in some cases. On the other hand, there is also a risk involved in adopting a firm moral position without knowing whether or not it is correct. That same white person could instead have chosen, without much thought, to adopt a pro-segregation stance, believing it preferable to adopt a firm moral position on every controversial issue. So, whether one thinks it wrong not to take a stand may ultimately depend on one’s weighing of the risks of an ill-advised moral commitment and the risks of passively supporting the status quo.
What do you think? Is it wrong not to take a stand? Let us know in the comments.
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I received my BA in philosophy from the University of Chicago and my PhD from the University of Notre Dame. I specialize in ethics, with a particular focus on the nature of normative reasons and the ethics of hypocrisy in its myriad forms. My favorite philosopher is Henry Sidgwick, since I believe—to borrow a line from Alfred North Whitehead, speaking about Plato—that much of analytic ethics in the 20th century is a series of footnotes to Sidgwick.