Thank you, Agar Mayor Gai-Makoon, for this fascinating question.
To begin with, the question is somewhat ambiguous. If by “right” we mean a legal right – a right created by some law-giving authority, backed by its coercive power – then it seems clear that we can have a right to do a bad thing. For example, as a citizen of a liberal democracy, I have a legal right to insult others, but this might be a very bad thing for me to do.
If by “right” we mean a moral right, then the question becomes a bit more interesting. I want to make two arguments that we do, in fact, have a moral right to do morally bad things. The first argument is based on an example; the second is based on a plausible principle that relates what we ought to do with what it would be morally bad for us to do.
Consider, first, a parent’s right to raise their children as they see fit. Because parents have these rights, they in effect have the right to raise their children in modestly morally bad ways; for example, by prescribing a poor diet for their child. We can be sure that these are rights because we tend to think that we are not permitted to interfere with parents’ choices in this area, and the essence of rights is the duty of non-interference. Presumably, giving parents these rights is justified on the grounds that the cost of preventing a parent from raising their child in a modestly morally bad way is vastly greater than the cost of allowing parents to make modestly morally bad choices for their children, since the former would involve massive intrusions upon family life and parental choice. In addition, the benefits of allowing parents discretion in how they raise their children outweigh, at least up to a point, the costs of giving them the right to make modestly morally bad choices. So, there seem to be widely recognized rights to do modestly morally bad things.
Now consider this principle: if a person morally ought to do something, then it would be morally bad for her not to do it. But many philosophers think there exist “genuine” moral dilemmas: cases in which a person ought to do two things, but can’t do both. An example might be the choice between being just (giving a person the punishment they deserve) and being merciful (giving that person less than the punishment they deserve). If the principle is true, then a person facing this dilemma does a morally bad thing whether she chooses to be just or merciful. If she chooses justice, then she fails to be merciful; but if she chooses mercy, then she fails to deliver justice – either way, she can’t win. But she still has a right to do either, in the sense that it would be wrong for anyone to try to interfere. This is another circumstance in which there appears to be a right to do a morally bad thing.
What do you think? Can we ever have the right to do a bad thing? Let us know in the comments.
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Image: The Shore, by Norman Adams (1965) (credit)
I received my BA in philosophy from the University of Chicago and my PhD from the University of Notre Dame. I specialize in ethics, with a particular focus on the nature of normative reasons and the ethics of hypocrisy in its myriad forms. My favorite philosopher is Henry Sidgwick, since I believe—to borrow a line from Alfred North Whitehead, speaking about Plato—that much of analytic ethics in the 20th century is a series of footnotes to Sidgwick.
I am really touched and convinced, Benjamin.
Thank you very much.