Thank you, John Robbins, for such a thoughtful question.
One way to approach it is to start by asking: what is a feminist? A person who believes in and supports feminism. And what is feminism? The term is somehow misleading, as it seems to mirror concepts like ‘masculinism’ or ‘male chauvinism’ – that is, the belief that women are naturally inferior to men and should be treated accordingly. In fact, feminism doesn’t advocate for the superiority of women over men, as its counter-concept does: the Cambridge Dictionary, for instance, defines feminism as the belief that women should be allowed the same rights, power, and opportunities as men and be treated in the same way. So, if you believe that everyone deserves equal treatment and that sexism is wrong, you are a feminist. If you believe that everyone should recognise this, you also believe that we should all be feminists (incidentally, this is what I believe!).
Of course, not everyone is on board with this project. Why might that be? Well, as I said, some people just think that women are inferior to men. They believe that women’s function is to please and serve men, as they are not rational enough or strong enough to compete with them. Others understand feminism to entail some sort of revenge of women against men, or the desire to put women’s interests first and overpower men. Some believe that feminism is an attack directed at traditional gender norms and ways of life, and worry that feminism demands that individuals live according to the ‘feminist ideal’, whether they like it or not.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that feminism is such a wide-ranging movement that it is possible to ascribe certain views (which opponents find problematic) to at least some advocates of feminism. Indeed, we should probably talk about ‘feminisms’ rather than ‘feminism’. A brief survey of the history of the movement shows that there are many ways of understanding feminism, which adhere more or less closely to the definition I offered at the beginning. Many liberal feminists, for instance, would completely agree with the definition. They would argue that the unit of analysis should be individuals, irrespective of their gender: everyone is equally capable of rationality; hence everyone should be endowed the same set of rights and opportunities. Radical feminists, by contrast, would argue that groups, rather than individuals, should be the unit of analysis, and that men as a group oppress women as a group (what the radical feminists define as ‘patriarchy’). This calls for different solutions to inequality: giving equal rights and opportunities to everyone may not be enough. Socialist and Marxist feminists would argue that patriarchy and capitalism are a unified system, and that emancipation can be achieved only through a restructuring of productive activities. Black feminists would argue that mainstream feminism is blind to the fact that not all women are in the same social position: the problem is not simply patriarchy, or capitalism, but racial oppression as well. And so on.
The upshot is that we may agree that we should all be feminists. But even then, we could still disagree on the kind of feminists we should be.
What do you think? Should we all be feminists? If so, what kind? Let us know in the comments.
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I did a BA in Philosophy at the University of Bologna, followed by an MA, MPhilStud and PhD at Birkbeck, University of London. I currently work at Birkbeck and King’s College as a teaching assistant, delivering seminars to CertHE, BA and MA students. My areas of expertise are political philosophy, ethics and gender. I am also interested in business ethics, ethics of science and technology, applied ethics and politics, and the history of political thought. My research focusses on liberal multiculturalism, autonomy and vulnerability. I am fascinated by the idea of freedom, its history, and its recent developments in political theory.